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Being-in-the-Void:  
A Heideggerian Analysis of Skydiving
Gunnar Breivik
Philosophy of sport as a field of study brings philosophy and sport together. This 
can be done in various ways. What I do in this article may seem like a daring 
project. I let Heidegger, one of the great thinkers of the 20th century, throw light 
on one specific sport activity—skydiving1. My hope is that some of this light 
reflects back and illuminates certain aspects of Heidegger’s views. This is not only 
a daring but also an ambitious project and it may fail. In that respect it resides 
within the spirit of both Heidegger and skydiving, where daring and failing have 
not been uncommon2. My focus will be on Heidegger’s early philosophy, primar-
ily Being and Time (12;13;14;15). In his early works Heidegger did not give many 
examples of phenomenological analysis. When he did, he typically described 
daily life in a living room, an office, or a workshop. We know that Heidegger was 
active in sport when he was young and that he was interested in sport all his life3. 
In his writings, however, there is almost nothing about sport. This does not mean 
that his early philosophy is irrelevant for an understanding of human involvement 
in sport. Quite the contrary. In this article I will explore a few basic ideas which 
are relevant.
 1. The first is related to how humans in general deal with the world. In his earlier 
works Heidegger gave detailed analyses of our practical way of dealing with 
the world and using equipment within a context, exemplified by the carpenter 
working in his workshop. From here Heidegger develops the notion of a 
“world” as the totality of practical references inside which humans (Dasein) 
live4. I contend that humans deal with equipmental environments also in sports.
 2. Heidegger also showed how the world, falls apart, slips away, and disappears 
in certain situations and mind states like anxiety. I think the perfect situation 
to analyze how the world disappears and how anxiety floods the mind is 
when a novice makes his/her first skydive. The experience of anxiety and 
a disintegration of the world is common to situations of high risk both in 
sport and outside sport. But nowhere is this experienced more directly and 
concretely than during the first skydive. The first part of this article will 
explore more in detail how the contextual reality and the Dasein’s world are 
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taken off their hinges during the first skydive. One is not only touching a void 
but falling through a void.5
 3. Heidegger maintains in the second part of Being and Time that Dasein has 
a tendency to fall into an average public understanding of oneself. Dasein 
thereby comes to live an inauthentic life. We tend to do what the others do. 
We follow “One” (das Man) and we do what One typically does. In anxiety, 
however, we become, aware of our finitude and our own “being-toward-
death”. We have the possibility of experiencing the original situation of 
being thrown into a world where we are not at home. From here it becomes 
possible to pursue one’s innermost and authentic projects. The second part 
of the article will explore how the first skydive is a confrontation with the 
possibility of death. The anxiety brings one back to the original situation. It 
is then meaningful to ask whether certain risk sports may facilitate authentic 
living. Or is authentic living rather totally independent of situational factors 
and circumstances like sport involvement?
Heidegger has not appeared in many recent discussions in philosophy of 
sport. Early sport philosophers like Slusher (23) focused on the “existentialist” 
aspects in Heidegger. Morgan (20) explored temporality in sport from a Heideg-
gerian perspective. Recent contributions by Moe (18) and Breivik (3) have dis-
cussed Heidegger’s relevance for understanding skillful coping in sport. These 
discussions have been triggered by Dreyfus’ use of Heidegger in developing an 
understanding of skill and expertise in daily life and in sport (6;7). The concept of 
authenticity, which is central in this article, was discussed by Paul Standish (24) 
in his overview of Heidegger and sport.6 In early Heidegger the problem of 
authenticity is central (4;6;8;9). It is time to bring authenticity more into focus 
also in philosophy of sport discussions.
As mentioned I will bring together two themes that I think are interconnected: 
equipmental coping with the environment and coping with situations where we 
encounter anxiety, the possibility of death, but also opportunities for authentic 
living. There are several reasons for choosing skydiving as a sport that is well-
suited as focus for a phenomenological exploration. First, skydiving is an activity 
where one not only figuratively, but quite literally is “in-the-void”. One is falling 
through empty air. Furthermore I have personal experience of skydiving and have 
conducted empirical studies of skydiving and skydivers. Thus I have experienced 
the phenomenon, which I hope is an advantage for describing and analyzing it 
correctly. My analysis will proceed through a series of steps, starting with an 
interpretation of the use of equipment in daily life and in sport, and how we estab-
lish a world of references and meaning. The next step will be to describe the cir-
cumstances under which that world is disrupted. I claim here that the most dra-
matic disruption and in a sense disappearance of “world” is experienced during 
the first sky dive. In this section Heidegger’s notions of anxiety and being-toward-
death are in focus. But when novices gradually become more experienced, the 
equipmental context becomes re-established on a new level. The last part of the 
article discusses how the problem of authentic living may be solved by continu-
ally seeking out extreme situations.
A Heideggerian Analysis of Skydiving  31
Dasein’s Daily Dealing With the World— 
The Workshop and the Sports Field
The life-long goal of Heidegger’s philosophy was to understand the meaning of 
Being. In Being and Time and in other early works he tried to reach this goal by 
starting with an analysis of the human mode of Being since it is only human 
beings who have an understanding of Being in general and of their own being in 
particular (13;14;15). Even if few philosophers have been willing to follow up on 
his question of Being, many agree that he has made a substantial contribution to 
modern philosophy by overcoming the subject-object dichotomy and by focusing 
on the human practical involvement with the world. Our primary involvement 
with the world is not theoretical understanding; we are not isolated from the world 
but intermeshed with it. As an illustration of “the tremendous contribution of Hei-
degger” Charles Taylor takes us right to sport: “We can draw a neat line between 
my picture of an object, and an object, but not between my dealing with the object 
and that object. It may make sense to ask us to focus on what we believe about 
something, say a football, even in the absence of that thing; but when it comes to 
playing football, the corresponding suggestion would be absurd. The actions 
involved in the game can’t be done without the object; they include the object. 
Take it away and we have something quite different – people miming a game on 
the stage, perhaps.” (26:*p.12)
The human mode of being which Heidegger calls “Dasein” is therefore 
defined simply as “Being-in-the-world”.7 Following Brentano and Husserl, Hei-
degger maintains that Dasein is linked to the world in a primordial manner. There 
is no world without Dasein.8 Since Dasein has an understanding of what it means 
to be, it can understand not only itself but also other beings in their Being. Hei-
degger analyzes two modes of being in Being and Time, that of human beings and 
of things. Things are primarily and most of the time met not as pure objects but as 
equipment. Things are available for use for different purposes. This instrumental 
aspect of things is more basic than their objective characteristics, which come in 
focus only when we passively stare at them, describe them, decompose them into 
parts and analyze them as de-contextualized objects. This can happen in various 
situations, science being the most advanced way of relating to things as pure 
objects.
Dasein’s daily life is filled with busy occupation where things are encoun-
tered and used as equipment. We use equipment (Zeug) to write, to work and to 
drive (Schreib-zeug, Werk-zeug, and Fahr-zeug). In the carpenter’s workshop, 
items of equipment are ready at hand to be used: hammer, nails, and planks. The 
equipment is used “in-order-to” do something. A hammer is used to hammer with; 
nails are used to fasten the planks; the planks are used to build the house; the 
house is a place to live; and to live is that what it is all about. The pieces of equip-
ment thus refer to each other in a referential context. The goal toward which the 
equipment is used is ultimately human living, being-in-the-world.
In their daily use equipment disappears into context. A piece of equipment 
does not exist by itself and in isolation. It only exists as a piece of equipment in a 
totality with other pieces of equipment, organized around something that needs to 
32    Breivik
be done, for instance to build a house. In our daily dealings things or equipment 
are always located somewhere. They have their place and their neighborhood. 
They belong somewhere, in a proper distance from us. The proper distance is not 
too far away and not too close, but in an average distance where we can reach out 
and have the equipment ready to hand. By organizing our dealings with the world 
in this way we reduce distance.
It is easy to see how things are used as equipment by the carpenter or the 
tailor, but Heidegger extends equipmentality to include the design and use of the 
clock in the church tower or the roof above the railway station. Equipmentality is 
thus a wide concept that includes all forms of use of something for some purpose, 
all the “for which”, “in-order-to” “toward-which” and “for-the-sake-of-which”.
It seems therefore reasonable to extend the concept of equipment to equip-
ment in sport contexts, but introduce discriminations that highlight differences 
between equipment used in different contexts, like sport and work. Some types of 
equipment cut across such distinctions. A sailboat can, if necessary, be used to 
transport goods and to win races. Similarly with cars. But specialization makes 
racing cars different from family cars. Therefore most types of equipment used in 
sports are closely linked to its specific function in a sport. Even if a soccer ball can 
be used for several forms of unorganized play, its primary function is on the soccer 
field where it is a necessary piece of equipment for the game to take place. The 
players can then develop the advanced skills with the ball that include dribbling 
and scoring goals. The equipment used in sport thus represents a special category 
of equipment, different from equipment used at work. In sports the purpose is not 
to change the world, but rather to play with it, explore its possibilities and let it 
be.9 Heidegger does not distinguish between different types of instrumentality at 
work and sport. It is however relevant for more fine-grained phenomenological 
analyses pertinent to sport.
According to Heidegger Dasein most of the time goes about what s/he has to 
do without being aware of how equipment functions in instrumental totalities. In 
work as well as in sport contexts, both single pieces of equipment and the instru-
mental totality become apparent only when something is missing or goes wrong. 
The hammer is usually inconspicuously available as a tool and it functions with-
out being identified as such. It becomes apparent only when it is missing or does 
not function any more. Then the whole context lights up. Similarly when I have no 
time to do the work or when a piece of equipment is not available, the whole total-
ity presents itself as something that needs to be done but cannot be done. When 
players meet on the field and a football is not available, then the necessity of a 
football for the game to function suddenly becomes apparent. Heidegger main-
tains that it is in circumstances where the equipmental functioning breaks down 
that we become aware of the phenomenon of a world. The world is that wherein 
Dasein lets things be encountered as equipment. The world is the totality of all the 
functioning equipmental totalities and contexts. It is that wherein Dasein lives and 
moves. It is the totality of references and meanings.
When equipment breaks down, not only the specific surrounding world 
becomes apparent as such. The equipment changes from being available to being 
simply an object with certain characteristics and properties. At the same time we 
change our attitude toward the object from practical application to theoretical 
inspection. We focus on more objective features. The hammer looks so and so, it 
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has physical characteristics, this shape and weight and so on. Our stance toward it 
switches from handling it as a piece of equipment invisibly functioning in an 
equipmental totality to seeing it as a separate individual entity with a certain 
shape, color, weight, hardness etc. This switch can happen in three ways:
 1. A piece of equipment may show itself to be damaged or unsuitable. When 
unusable, it becomes conspicuous as an unsuitable tool. It becomes something 
present-at-hand. And “it shows itself as an equipmental thing that looks so 
and so, and which, in its availability as looking that way, has constantly been 
present-at-hand too” (13: p. 73).10
 2. In our concerned dealing we not only find equipment that is unsuitable, 
but also equipment that is simply missing, not at hand. Heidegger calls this 
obtrusiveness. The more pressing the situation is, the more the unavailability 
of the missing equipment becomes visible. The whole equipmental structure 
almost turns into something present-at-hand. The equipmental character is 
fading and we stand helpless, unable to continue our concerned dealings.
 3. The last deficient mode of readiness-to-hand is when the ready-to-hand 
becomes unready-to-hand, not by being unusable or missing, but by standing 
in the way of our concern. This happens when we have no time for a project 
because there is another project that needs to be taken care of first. This shows 
the obstinacy of that which has to be done first and thereby makes the wanted 
project not presently ready-to-hand.
In the modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness and obstinacy that which is 
ready-to-hand looses its availability to a certain extent. Heidegger seems to think 
that it is only when the equipmental condition breaks down that the world becomes 
apparent as world. In the following I will describe what happens in situations 
where equipmentality breaks down in an even more serious manner, where assign-
ments and references are torn apart and there is no structure and meaning. There 
is no longer a world.
The Radical Disruption of the “World”— 
Jumping out of an Airplane
Let us now look at what happens when novices jump out of an airplane for the first 
time. My first static line jump went like this: “Sitting in the small aircraft with an 
instructor and other novices, yet alone, absorbed in my own thoughts, bewildered, 
frightened, trying to concentrate, and rehearsing instructions. Suddenly, at exit 
altitude, the side door opens, there is a roar from the engines, moving toward the 
exit door, the wind blowing, a rush of fear, heavy breathing, sitting in the door 
frame, the legs being pulled to the side by the strong wind, emptiness below, a 
feeling of unreality, this is absurd, jumping out, falling, out of control, faster, 
counting, sudden stop, hanging, parachute above my head, flying, trying to grab 
the steering lines, yes flying and steering the parachute, a sort of control, empti-
ness below my feet, looking for the landing site, soaring like a bird, joy, pride.”11
A static line jump is made from around 3000 feet, the parachute being auto-
matically opened by a line fastened to a hook inside the plane. The jumper falls 
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approximately five seconds before the parachute is opened. Another method for 
beginners is Accelerated Free Fall (AFF) where the novice together with two 
instructors jump from 12000 feet and fall 40 seconds or so before the parachutes 
are deployed. The instructors stabilize the body of the jumper during the fall. My 
second jump was an AFF jump. Here the confusion and disorientation was even 
stronger since we jumped out backward from the doorframe of a larger plane. It 
was like a whale had opened its belly. Our exits were poorly synchronized, result-
ing in my falling out of control and totally disoriented, with nothing to grab on to, 
into a vast emptiness.
If the experiential description is made with greater phenomenological detail 
and analyzed in relation to notions of totality, reference, and meaning we see that 
the novice jumper sitting in the plane and waiting to do the first jump has no 
knowledge about what will happen in the air and what it will feel like. Both the 
knowledge and the qualitative feel come only when the jumper is in the air. In 
contrast to the familiarity of a workshop or a soccer field, empty air is totally 
unfamiliar. There is no equipmental context where pieces of equipment refer to 
each other and are organized in relation to a known goal. There is not even firm 
ground below one’s feet, nothing to grab or hold on to, one is falling, disoriented 
and out of control. There is only emptiness. Between the time of jumping out of 
the plane and hanging in the parachute, one is falling thorough a void. The “being-
in-the-world” has become a “being-in-the-void”. The equipmental context is not 
only broken but absent—the reference structure is lacking. There is nothing to 
refer to, with which to orient oneself. There is no circumspection (Umsicht).
We have seen that Heidegger describes three ways in which the equipmental 
context or the equipmental ordering of our daily dealing with the world breaks 
down. According to Dreyfus (6), conspicuousness, obstinacy and obtrusiveness 
represent an increasingly serious breakdown. In all three cases however there is a 
problem with a specific piece of equipment that leads to the disclosure of the total-
ity of the equipmental context and hence to the phenomenon of world. But how 
should we understand the situation where the novice skydiver jumps out of the 
plane and falls out of control through a void? It is not only a piece of equipment 
which is malfunctioning (conspicuousness). It is not only something else, some-
thing more pressing, which needs to be done (obstinacy). This is more serious 
than when something is missing completely (obtrusiveness) for two reasons. First 
it is not a specific piece of equipment that is missing. It is equipment as such. 
There is nothing to grab on to. And secondly there is no established context where 
a piece could be missing. The context as such is missing. There is no world, but 
only a void. There is only the jumper, the falling and the void. In many ways it is 
similar to what Heidegger calls “thrownness” (Geworfenheit), the fact of being 
thrown into the world where one just has to live. For Heidegger the original phe-
nomenon of what it means to live is the wordless subject. Originally and at the 
depth of our being we are solus ipse. In a very concrete and real way the first sky-
dive brings the skydiver back to the original human condition. But as we shall see 
the meeting with a void not only brings the skydiver back to the original situation 
but also forward toward his/her own death.
We should note here that there is a temporal similarity between being thrown 
(geworfen), and jumping out of a plane. To establish a world takes time. Hei-
degger analyses the situation in the workshop where the carpenter is already 
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installed in his activities, already coping with the equipment. His coping has been 
established through a long learning process from being a novice carpenter to 
being an expert. The difference between learning to become a carpenter and learn-
ing to skydive is that the carpenter can gradually establish a familiarity with the 
surroundings, with the equipment and what needs to be done, while the skydiver 
starts by being abruptly thrown into a new situation. There is a rapid, discontinu-
ous transition from being in the plane to being in the void. It is impossible to jump 
a little or gradually out of a plane. In this respect skydiving is like being born. 
When one is born, an abrupt and total transition takes place.
Being-in-the-Void: 
Is It Accompanied by Fear or Anxiety?
Since Dasein is thrown into the world, it finds itself already existing (Fakizität) 
and already attuned in a certain way and in a certain state of mind (Befindlich-
keit). The daily dealing with the world is accompanied by various moods. Hei-
degger does not analyze the broad spectrum of moods that we experience in daily 
life, but concentrates on a few moods that play an important role in his analysis of 
the basic structures of human existence, such as fear and anxiety. Fear is a mood 
in which Dasein is afraid of something. Fear is directed in a specific direction, 
toward something specific that is experienced as fearsome. It could be a snake, a 
fire, or an approaching robber. And this fearsome something threatens Dasein in a 
specific manner. Heidegger says “When concern is afraid, it leaps from next to 
next, because it forgets itself and therefore does not take hold of any definite pos-
sibility” (14:p.392). In this situation the environment does not disappear but for 
Dasein, the environment “is encountered without his knowing his way about it any 
longer” (14: p. 342). As Dreyfus (6) correctly remarks, this is parallel to the miss-
ing or obtrusive tool. Dasein is not able to operate in a normal manner, dealing 
circumspectively with things. A missing or obtrusive tool or a paralyzing fear 
makes it impossible for Dasein to find its way in normal manner. In this way, the 
context as such, the equipmental totality, and in the last instance the phenomenon 
of world, becomes apparent as such.
Anxiety goes deeper than this. In anxiety the world as such glides away from 
under one’s feet. Anxiety is characterized by its indefinite character; it is nothing 
and nowhere. Anxiety does not come from a specific direction or in a specific 
manner. One does not know what one is afraid of, where the anxiety comes from 
and what one is concerned about. Heidegger maintains that in anxiety, Dasein is 
afraid and concerned about itself and in face of itself. “That in the face of which 
one has anxiety is Being-in-the-world as such.” (14: p. 186). Since anxiety is not 
related to something specific in the world like fear, it points to the possibility of 
having a world as such. “The obstinacy of the “nothing and nowhere within-the-
world” means as a phenomenon that the world as such is that in the face of which 
one has anxiety.” (14: p.187). This means that the jumping out of the airplane and 
being-in-the-void with nothing to grab and hold onto is a situation of anxiety and 
not fear. Sky diving reveals a situation where “readiness-to-hand” and the equip-
mental circumspection and hence a “world” cannot be constituted. There is no 
equipment and no context. There is quite literally a void, a condition of nothing-
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ness. Heidegger speaks of nothingness as the totally indefinite. What one is afraid 
of in anxiety is nothing specific, one does not know, it is nowhere, it is a nothing, 
a “nihil”. In the first skydive nothingness is experienced in a literal and bodily 
manner; one falls through the void, there is nothing to grab and hold on to, there 
is nothing to stop oneself from falling.
The short phenomenological descriptions of anxiety in Being and Time make 
it clear that Heidegger thinks that anxiety occurs gradually- things slip away, the 
ground breaks up, one does not understand what is going on, one is afraid of all 
and nothing (see 14). In skydiving the situation is different. There is a sharp transi-
tion from the situation in the plane with a surrounding world to the situation in the 
air where there is no world and only nothingness.
So far I have maintained that the situation of a novice falling through the void 
in his/her first skydive is accompanied by anxiety. But what about the situation in 
the plane before the jump? Is that a situation characterized by fear or anxiety? We 
know from empirical studies of novice skydivers that their heart rates rise continu-
ously while the aircraft approaches exit altitude at around 12,000 feet. The aver-
age heart rate among novices at exit is around 170 beats per minute (2). This 
means that the physiological activation and the corresponding emotions are very 
intense and strong. The novices get extremely frightened just by sitting in the 
plane thinking about what is going to happen. Are they feeling fear or anxiety in 
Heidegger’s terminology? The novices in the plane are thinking about the 
approaching exit. They will meet something totally new, they will fall out of con-
trol, and they may have problems opening the parachute and have to perform an 
emergency procedure. They may fail to do the procedure correctly and fall to their 
death. Consciously and unconsciously they know this. They are also afraid of 
making a fool of themselves, to fail in the face of others according to their own 
expectations about themselves. There is also a probably innate biological appre-
hension about stepping out into a void where the nearest visible support is distant. 
No animal would do that. But is this fear or anxiety? One could argue that the situ-
ation in the plane before exit is one of readiness-to-hand and instrumental coping. 
But this is only related to the situation in the plane. What the novice is afraid of is 
the prospect of jumping out into the void. What causes the heart to beat fast and a 
feeling of apprehension is the thought of the unknown, falling through the void, 
and the possibility of death. Thus, in one sense, it is a specific fear of something 
specific that lies ahead. On the other hand it is a fear of the unknown, of falling in 
a void that will be experienced with anxiety. One could provisionally characterize 
it as a fear of the possibility of anxiety.
We should note here that Heidegger’s short phenomenological descriptions of 
anxiety seem to characterize anxiety as a mild mood that gradually creeps in and 
transforms one’s world into something uncanny (unheimlich). One is not at home 
in the world and one’s own life any more. Similarly he refers in places to happi-
ness as a sort of light elation. We know however that both negative and positive 
emotion can be experienced both at low and high levels. In skydiving both fear/
anxiety and joy/happiness can be experienced intensely, where the body and its 
physiological systems are running on high and the brain is flooded by substances 
like adrenalin, endorphins, serotonin and cortisol (1). Skydiving as a phenomeno-
logical focus here, places the analysis of fear and anxiety at the upper end of the 
physiological activation scale. Thus, both anxiety and happiness can come in 
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slow, continuous tempered versions, as in Heidegger’s examples, and in fast, dis-
continuous and high-pitched versions.12
Anxiety, Death and Authentic Living
For Heidegger the self and the world are tied together in a unity. The human being 
is a being-in-the-world. But the self has a tendency to lose itself and become 
absorbed in the world in a way that makes it difficult to live an authentic life. The 
distinction between authentic and inauthentic living has a long tradition. Charles 
Taylor traces the idea to religious sources and shows how the idea of authenticity 
is a secular version of the idea of a God within (25). The ultimate truth is to be 
found inside each of us. Guignon (10) points out that the idea is central in modern 
philosophy. The idea of cultivating oneself and releasing the good in oneself is 
found in Emerson and Nietzsche. Bernard Williams, following Nietzsche, main-
tains that authenticity is one of the central ideas in his own thinking (27). It is the 
idea that some things are in an essential sense you, expressing what you are and 
others are not. Authenticity is a central to Stanley Cavell’s account of moral per-
fection, whose goal is to release rather than to restrain the good (5).
Heidegger’s idea of authenticity follows this tradition yet is strongly influ-
enced by Kierkegaard’s views on the duality of our lives. We tend to live our lives 
in an average, superficial way and we need to be brought to a confrontation with 
ourselves to reach a deeper and more honest understanding of ourselves and the 
world. Following Kierkegaard, Heidegger maintains that Dasein “falls” into the 
world and understands him/herself in an inauthentic manner. Humans have a ten-
dency to look at the others and do what they do. Guignon comments “Inauthentic-
ity is characterized by “falling” and “forgetting”. In the ordinary busy-ness of 
handling daily affairs, Dasein tends to become ensnared in its immediate concerns 
and to drift along with the take-for-granted practices of average everydayness. We 
hide behind social roles, enacting parts in familiar dramas and following the rules 
of socially approved games.” (9: p. 227). We do what we are expected to do. We 
follow the average, the common, and the usual. Heidegger calls this abstract nor-
mative entity the One (das Man). We follow the One and thus the One influences 
what we do, what we think, and the norms we follow, although such norms and 
goals are not our own. Heidegger says that we do not live “eigentlich”. “Eigen” in 
German means “own”. We do not live according to our own deepest concerns but 
live in an inauthentic way, following the One. Only under certain circumstances, 
in certain situations, are we able to know and act from our own deepest concerns 
and goals, to find out what we really are and what we should do.
Situations of love, of boredom, and especially of anxiety are able to lead to a 
confrontation with ourselves. Anxiety leads to a confrontation with one’s own 
finitude and death and is the key to an authentic living. What happens in anxiety 
is that both our surroundings and the things and entities discovered within the 
world lose their significance and become insignificant. The world collapses into 
itself. Dasein now becomes unsettled. It is no longer at home in the world. It is 
thrown back on itself. Dasein becomes solus ipse, Dasein is on its own. This 
means that in anxiety Dasein is brought back from the fall into the world and put 
face to face with its own finitude and death.
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As Guignon maintains, it is important that authenticity does not detach us 
from the world.13 Authenticity is not getting in touch with deeper inner selves nor 
rising above the herd, but a confrontation with ourselves. “In the experience of 
anxiety, we are forced to confront our own finitude” (8: p. 229). We collect our-
selves. “Facing death, one is pulled back from the dispersal, distraction, and for-
getfulness of everydayness.” (8: p. 229). We instead focus on a limited range of 
possibilities which are determined by the end and so are understood as finite. We 
take over our situatedness with resoluteness. “Authentic self-focusing, understood 
as a resolute reaching forward into a finite range of possibilities, gives coherence, 
cohesiveness, and integrity to a life course.” (8: p. 229). Skydiving seems to be 
one such possibility for self-focusing and cohesiveness.
But the focus is difficult to uphold. Resoluteness evaporates. We continue to 
tend to fall into the average understanding of the One. In this transition, anxiety is 
transformed to fear according to Heidegger. Fear is derived from anxiety as an 
inauthentic mood. It covers up the pure naked that of existence by giving the anx-
ious Dasein something specific to be concerned about, a specific fear about 
something.
From a Heideggerian perspective the situation after the exit from the airplane 
where one falls through the void, filled with anxiety, is the original situation. It 
reveals the naked human condition in the world. A specific phobia, like the fear of 
heights or fear of flying, is a specific modification of anxiety into a fear that one 
can handle by taking precautions and making oneself safe in various ways.
Anxiety is usually considered as something negative that should be avoided 
or treated, but for Heidegger it is an important and necessary condition for getting 
to know the deepest aspects of human existence14. Anxiety reveals that ultimately 
we are finite beings that have to relate in one way or other to our own death. For 
Heidegger being-toward-death is not related to the biological phenomenon of 
passing away as a physical being. Nor is it the simple event of one’s life being 
over, as it is sooner or later over for everyone. Instead, death is Dasein’s own last 
and definite possibility. It is the possibility of impossibility. It gives Dasein’s life 
a wholeness and totality. Death is something inside one’s life that one always has 
to relate to, either by covering it up or by facing its reality.
The situations where Dasein faces anxiety provide opportunities to relate 
authentically to the possibility of one’s own death and to choose from the deepest 
and most personal concerns and goals. Dasein is, however, not able to continue 
this authentic way of life but falls back to the world and the One and ways of 
doing things that cover up deeper possibilities. Most of the time our lives are lived 
in an inauthentic manner. It is worth noticing here that while it is possible accord-
ing to Heidegger to improve and become an expert in the daily circumspective 
dealing with equipmental surroundings, irreversible progress in continuous 
authentic living is impossible. We always fall back into the “worldly” understand-
ing of ourselves. There are authentic moments and situations but no continuous 
improvement. The novice skydiver may have glimpses of authenticity during the 
first free fall, but will soon fall back into the average understanding of the One.
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How Experienced Skydivers Fall into the World 
and Become Inauthentic
The novice skydiver may decide to continue with skydiving after the first jump. S/
he may gradually become more proficient and eventually become an expert sky-
diver. During this process one gradually learns to master the exit, and all the vari-
ous positions and movements during free fall and landing. S/he learns how to use 
the wind pressure to perform wonderful movements in empty space: turns and 
twists, summersaults, vertical standing, horizontal tracking and so on. S/he 
becomes attuned to the void. S/he learns that there are gravitational forces and air 
pressures to maneuver on.Arms and legs become pieces of equipment to stabilize 
and steer the body. In this way the void becomes a world. The void becomes avail-
able as a “playspace”. At the same time undifferentiated anxiety gives way to 
specific fears of specific failures like a “line-over”, when the parachute cords twist 
around the canopy so that it does not properly fill with air. Then an emergency 
procedure must be performed to get rid of the main parachute and deploy the 
reserve.
As the skydiver becomes proficient and learns to cope with the situations in 
the void, a new situation of controlled equipmental dealing becomes established. 
The skydiver can handle the equipment and his body in the same way as a carpen-
ter handles his equipment in his workshop. The skydiver becomes attuned to the 
“world” of the void. This also means that problems are not experienced as total 
and chaotic but as specific and limited. It is like the workshop where a piece of 
equipment may malfunction and become obtrusive. The altimeter may malfunc-
tion or the parachute may not function as well as expected. Or situations of obsti-
nacy may occur. There is no time for skydiving, something more pressing needs 
to be done. Or a piece of equipment may be lacking and skydiving is made impos-
sible. Specific problems with equipment correspond to specific fears of failures. 
But for experienced skydivers, problems can be handled and controlled like in 
other forms of circumspective dealing with the surrounding world.
Thus the proficient skydiver becomes absorbed in the “world of skydiving” 
and becomes less authentic. S/he does what one is expected to do in that world. S/
he becomes guided by the One. S/he does not live from his/ her own deepest and 
most authentic concerns. S/he no longer needs to confront anxiety and the possi-
bility of death and dying. It may seem strange that as the skydiver becomes settled 
in the skydiving milieu, becomes more proficient and masters the activity, s/he 
runs the risk of becoming less authentic. The point that Heidegger makes is that 
human dealing with the equipmental contexts leads to absorption in the environ-
ing world. One ends up living in the everyday world in the same way as everybody 
else. That is true also for skydivers that become part of the everydayness of the 
skydiving milieu. This means that authenticity is not tied to skydiving as such but 
that it is an instrument or a specific way of facilitating experiences that lead to a 
more authentic life. But skydiving may also lead to inauthentic absorption a the 
skydiving routine.
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Do Risk Takers Live More Authentically?
We are led to the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that the more a person 
becomes an experienced skydiver, the fewer possibilities there are for authentic 
living. And furthermore, if this person wants to live authentically S/he should 
expose herself to new and unfamiliar situations where s/he may experience a 
breakdown in equipmental handling and where the world glides away in anxiety. 
The skydiver is then thrown back on his/herself and what living is all about. The 
experience is once more one of a solus ipse, a worldless self. The world has col-
lapsed and the self confronts a void where it is not at home any more. In Hei-
degger’s expression the world has once more become “un-heimlich” (“un-home-
like” or uncanny) (12: p. 188). Dasein is no longer at home in the world.
We know from empirical studies that “high sensation seekers” want strong 
stimulation and challenges and are more willing than others to take risks (1). They 
take chances in various areas of life and tend to get involved in risk sports. They 
are often portrayed as irresponsible, hedonistic, and selfish. But if the analysis 
above is correct they may rather be people who are living or trying to live a more 
authentic life. They are willing to take risks, to lose control and thus expose them-
selves to anxiety. In a quite literal way, they act to confront the possibility of their 
own imminent death. But perhaps this is too simple.
First, anxiety arises not only in skydiving and other activities with physical 
risk. Heidegger thought that it is impossible to predict and control when and 
where anxiety will surface. This is why anxiety is nowhere and everywhere, unex-
pectedly surfacing out of the blue. Second, the expert skydiver knows that the 
world of skydiving is never safe. Even they get into situations where the equip-
ment fails partially or completely, as when both the main and reserve parachutes 
malfunction. The opening mechanisms may fail in which case one will fall through 
the emptiness to certain, unavoidable death. This means that danger is always 
lurking, and that anxiety inevitably lies beneath feelings of control able to erupt at 
any time. Even among experts, specific fears may explode into anxiety.
Underlying several of the arguments in this paper is a tension between a 
structural and a motivational account of anxiety and authenticity/inauthenticity. 
The structural perspective implies that Dasein has a tendency to fall into the world 
and understand itself from the perspective of a world of things. This absorption in 
the world is a necessary part of the human being-in-the-world. From this perspec-
tive both inauthentic and authentic living have the same “value” since they are 
necessary parts of the ways Dasein exists. A motivational account is added to this 
structural account in the second part of Being and Time, which gives this perspec-
tive strong normative overtones. Here Dasein flees from the nullity experienced in 
the face of anxiety. Dreyfus thinks that Heidegger’s notion of anxiety as flight 
goes back to Kierkegaard, leading to contradictions. “Heidegger’s secularized 
version of the antipathy of anxiety as repulsion in the face of meaninglessness 
makes no sense. If anxiety is the truth of Dasein’s condition and the truth sets free, 
why doesn’t Dasein seek anxiety rather than flee it?” (6: p. 334) Taylor Carman 
tries to solve this problem by interpreting what Heidegger calls authentic resolute-
ness (Entschlossenheit) as a resistance to the falling into the world. “Authenticity 
is conceivable, then, since it is possible for Dasein to resist the force of falling 
while falling, just as one can resist the force of gravity while remaining continu-
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ously in its grip.” (4: p. 28) If we end up failing in our efforts, it is according to 
Carman because our bodily and psychological resources are limited. Inauthentic-
ity is thus a result of Dasein’s inability to muster the necessary resources to coun-
teract the inclination to fall.
Whether we accept the structural or motivational approach, the situation of 
novice skydivers is especially well suited a phenomenological analysis of anxiety. 
Skydiving triggers anxiety in novices in a way that easily leads to a serious 
rethinking of what life is all about and what one’s deeper life projects are and 
should be. One quickly comes to question whether one lives an authentic life or 
whether other people (the One) are really at the steering wheel. For many people, 
just to sign up for a skydiving course means to confront anxiety and to relate to the 
possibility of one’s own death.
In this paper, the first skydive was made the phenomenological focus for two 
reasons: a) In a unique and concrete way, the first skydive opens the possibility of 
the world being replaced by a void, a kind of “void” that never was experienced or 
considered by Heidegger. An analysis of this void opens up a deeper understand-
ing of the strong connection between the disintegration of world, anxiety, being-
toward-death and hence the possibility of authentic living. The experience of 
anxiety and the possibility of imminent death, however, is not limited to this or 
any other sport situation. Disintegration of one’s world and loosing hold of one’s 
equipmental surroundings may occur when loosing control over one’s car on the 
race track or when falling in a difficult and exposed situation in climbing. What is 
special about the first skydive is that it exemplifies the phenomenon of void, i.e., 
the possibility of not only a disruption of one’s surrounding world but of a total 
disappearance of that world into void. Experiencing the first skydive, of course, is 
only one example of a more general experiential possibility. J. S. Russell has 
remarked on this common feature of risk sports: They are valuable since they 
facilitate “self-affirmation” and represent “an opportunity for confronting and 
pressing beyond certain apparent limits of personal, and indeed human, physical 
and psychological capacities in ways not afforded by other normally available 
human activity.” (21: p. 14). This “pressing beyond” is what makes deep aspects 
of our existence accessible. Risk sports make possible a confrontation with one-
self and the possibility of more authentic living, which from a Heideggerian point 
of view, entails relating to one’s own death. We are thrown into the world and our 
exit from it is deadly. Risk sport reminds us of this in a very concrete way.
Conclusion
The purpose of this article was twofold. In the first part I wanted to show how 
Heidegger’s notion of the human ”being-in-the-world” is in sharp contrast to a 
situation where one is ”being-in-a-void”, as experienced during the first skydive. 
I showed how this situation is in radical contrast to, and a negation of, the ordinary 
situation where the self is tied to the familiar equipmental contexts of one’s world. 
For Heidegger the phenomenon of “world” becomes apparent when the equip-
mental context breaks down through failures of various kinds, such as when the 
equipment one needs is obtrusive or missing. The situation during the first skydive 
is most radical since both equipment and context are missing, and so the “world” 
is missing.
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The second part of the article explained how the phenomenon of anxiety is 
causally related to the situation of being-in-the-void. Heidegger did not describe 
well enough how these two phenomena are tied together. For Heidegger break-
down in equipment leads to awareness of the context of a world with its references 
and assignments. At the same time anxiety is regarded as a phenomenon that may 
surface nowhere and everywhere. By using skydiving as phenomenological focus 
I tried to show how the radical disruption of equipmentality and the loss of a 
“world” are intrinsically linked to anxiety. I started the article by saying that Hei-
degger could throw light on skydiving, and that some light might reflect back, and 
I think it did. There is a tight connection between the disruption of the world and 
the experience of anxiety and this connection is phenomenologically supported by 
the example of novice skydiving. Furthermore, anxiety opens the way for an expe-
rience of being-toward-death. In this way skydiving is a good phenomenological 
example of a more general phenomenon, since skydiving makes the possibility of 
one’s own death very concrete and direct.
For Heidegger, the possibility of authentic decisions about one’s life projects 
is tied to the experience of anxiety and the resolute acceptance of one’s own death. 
This naturally leads to the question whether some situations of risk, uncertainty, 
and breakdown of the world are especially well suited as introductions to authen-
tic living. Even if authenticity can only be experienced for short periods, we 
should consider seeking situations that facilitate it, and risk sports offer such situ-
ations. But being involved in risk sports does not mean that one is immune to 
inauthentic living. The skydiving example shows that as one continues with sky-
diving and becomes proficient, one gradually establishes a world of control, of 
references and assignments where the void is exchanged for a “world” of skydiv-
ing. The proficient skydiver masters the air so that it becomes her/his performance 
arena. Similarly when on the ground, s/he has become part of the skydiving com-
munity, absorbed in a way that results in an inauthentic following of the One. This 
development might be used to justify moving on to new, riskier versions of sky-
diving or to other dangerous sports where again the experience of anxiety and 
breakdown of worlds would open the door to authenticity15.
Breakdown of one’s world may happen in many ways. Some are willed and 
premeditated, others are unwilled and come as a surprise. As Heidegger empha-
sized, anxiety may surface anywhere and out of the blue and thus open up possi-
bilities for confrontations with oneself. However, he says little about specific 
activities and places structurally designed to present us with the possibility of 
dying and thus for experiencing anxiety and self-confrontation, where one must 
“press beyond” to affirm oneself authentically. Risk sports in general represent 
such activities and situations. Of these sports, skydiving is exemplary, since as a 
novice one exposes oneself to a unique combination of a radical breakdown of 
world, being-in-a-void, the experience of anxiety, and being-toward-death, which 
according to Heidegger, should facilitate a more authentic understanding of what 
life is about.
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Notes
1. In this article I use the expression “skydiving” and not “parachute jumping”. In the begin-
ning when the point was, under military and other operations, to get from a plane down to the 
ground in a safe manner one could talk about parachute jumping. Later when the activity devel-
oped as a sport and the point was to have an extended time in the air, a free fall, the notion of 
skydiving seemed more appropriate. The point was the free fall period and not the hanging in 
the parachute. Later new activities and forms of competition have developed where the point is 
to maneuver the parachute in advanced ways, either for acrobatic moves or precision landing.
2. Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazi movement has been much discussed. He never 
admitted his commitment to the Nazi movement but in his later work Poetry, Language, Thought 
(16) he went as far as to say “Wer gross denkt, muss gross irren.” (“He who thinks greatly, must 
err greatly.”)
3. When he was young he played left wing on the football team in Messkirch where he grew 
up. He was interested in football all his life. When he was at his cottage in Todtnauberg he used 
to visit neighbors to look at TV when Bayern München and his favorite player Franz Becken-
bauer played (18). Heidegger was an avid skier and from his hut in Todtnauberg and elsewhere 
he took long hiking and skiing trips.
4. Following both the translation of Sein und Zeit (12) by Macquarrie and Robinson (12) 
and the commentary by Dreyfus (6) I will not translate the German term Dasein, which denotes 
the mode of being of humans, but will use the German word as a technical term. Heidegger 
opposed traditional ontology with its focus on static substances and things and instead intro-
duced a dynamic way of looking at happenings and events. The human being is not a thing or a 
substance with certain characteristics but has a way of being that is Dasein, being both present 
(Da-sein) and there (Da-sein). Inherent in Dasein is that it stands out from other beings; it knows 
that it exists and cares about its own existence. Everything that Dasein does in the world is linked 
to this ultimate care or concern (Sorge).
5. In skydiving one is by purpose falling through the air. One may also by accident and 
unwillingly fall through the air in other air sports, like hanggliding or paragliding. In some other 
sports one is close to big vertical empty air spaces, like in big wall climbing, where one may also 
accidentally take a fall through the air and experience a sort of void. ”Touching the void” is the 
title of the book of Joe Simpson who on his way down from peak Siula Grande in Peru took an 
uncontrolled fall that almost ended in tragedy (22).
6. Paul Standish (24) refers to Higuchi who points out that the idea of authenticity ultimately 
has its source in death and that the sudden death of a friend or a colleague may bring us out of the 
tranquilized reassurance of everydayness. It would be natural to think of risk sports as an even 
closer candidate for breaking the everydayness of normal life. But this possibility is not followed 
up by Higuchi or Standish even if “the sometimes fatal allure of dangerous sports” is hinted at 
(24: p. 268) Instead the focus is on the everydayness of sports and the finality that is experienced 
when being knocked out of a competition or beaten. I think “dangerous sports” present better 
opportunities than competitive failure to analyze what authenticity means.
7. In his fundamental ontology Heidegger defines the basic structures in Dasein’s existence. 
Heidegger introduces a distinction between ontological and ontic, where ontological denotes the 
fundamental structural aspects of concrete ontic instantiations. For instance, it belongs to human 
existence to have a world (ontological), but there are many different instances of world (ontic). 
Similarly the distinction between “existential” and “existentiell” implies that Dasein is always in 
a certain mood but there are many concrete instances (specific moods). Even if Heidegger tries 
to describe “objectively” the basic structural conditions of human existence he admits that it is 
easy to be inspired by certain ideals and subjective preferences. This is especially relevant for 
part II of Being and Time where the existentialist individualism comes to the fore. Heidegger 
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asks: “Is there not, however, a definite ontical way of taking authentic existence, a factical ideal 
of Dasein, underlying our ontological Interpretation of Dasein’s existence? That is so indeed.” 
(14: p. 358). But he thinks admitting his presuppositions are no problem since they can be played 
out and penetrated in the further analyses.
8. Heidegger does not deny that there is an objective, independent universe, a natural envi-
ronment that will continue to exist after Dasein has died. But the world is something that is 
constructed by the human mode of being. We have a reminiscence of this understanding when 
we speak about world history, which means the history of humans. We talk about the environing 
world (“Umwelt”) which means the close surroundings where we are occupied with our daily 
dealings. We talk about the work world and the sports world.
9. After the football game the world has not changed. However this is relevant only if work is 
taken as physical work to provide food or shelter. Work also includes entertainment etc. People 
can work; they can earn money by playing. Professional football players work and earn money 
through playing games.
10. Here Heidegger shows how presence-at-hand comes forth from readiness-to-hand. But the 
result is not pure presence-at-hand since a damaged item of equipment retains something of 
its equipment-character. After being repaired, it can be put into use again and disappear in the 
equipmental context.
11. We know from empirical studies that the subjective experience described here has a physi-
ological and psychological underlying reality (2). Whereas novice skydivers have around 170 
bpm at exit the experts have an average of 140 bpm which is still high considering that they sit 
still before exit. The adrenaline level reaches 6–12 times above normal and the level of catechol-
amines is high above normal. Endorphins flood the blood system. The novices experience fear 
and anxiety, disorientation, tunnel sight, and some get transmarginal inhibition. Most novices 
experience excitement and even ecstasy when they have landed safely on the ground. Typically 
around 80% of the novices quit skydiving after the first few jumps. This indicates that the experi-
ence is exciting but scary for most people.
12. Michael Apter (1) distinguishes between people who are excitement-seeking and people 
who are anxiety-avoidant. For the first type low arousal tends to be experienced as boring whereas 
high arousal is linked to excitement. For the other type low arousal feels pleasant whereas high 
arousal leads to anxiety. Sky divers tend to be excitement-seekers or high sensation seekers (2).
13. It is an ongoing discussion whether the common world or the individual has priority in 
the constitution of being-in-the-world. For Dreyfus the notion of a common world, of common 
institutions and practices are before the constitution of the individual. Randall Havas disagrees 
with this view. Following Nietzsche he states that it is “the category of the individual that should 
have pride of place in our reflections on the nature of intelligibility and not just any individual 
but rather the very one that is each of us” (11: p. 41) The reason is that it is the commitment of 
the individual and the right to make promises and take responsibility that is the foundation of 
a society. It is thus not attitude but rather commitment that characterizes the authentic person. 
According to Havas the difference between what “gets called authenticity and inathenticity is 
surely not that an authentic person faces up groundlessness while his inauthentic counterpart 
flees it, but rather that the former takes responsibility for himself while the latter seeks to avoid 
it.” (11: p. 41)
14. Heidegger later changed his views on the role of anxiety (6). In his 1929 lecture “What is 
Metaphysics?” anxiety is not interpreted as a source of insight into the situation of Dasein but 
rather as an experience of the “oblivion of being” characteristic of the modern age. Anxiety is 
seen as a response to the rootlessness of the modern technological world. Later Heidegger went 
to the pre-Socratic philosophers to find sources for a view of where humans free from anxiety 
and at home in the world. He looked for a new rootedness that could counteract and make up for 
the modern rootlessness.
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15. In this article the focus has been on the void and the falling through the air. However 
other risk sports can give experiences that are structurally similar to the “being-out –of-con-
trol” through the first skydive. White water kayakers experience situations in heavy white water 
where they are upside down, under water, out of control and have a feeling of being in a big 
washing machine. It is impossible to establish equipmental control and the structure and context 
of a “world”.
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